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Spanish town halls?, do Spanish town halls follow the strategies suggested in Miles and Snow’s model? and, is 
there a relationship between the strategic position adopted by town halls and their stance on outsourcing? 
Design/Methodology/approach- In order to achieve these aims a questionnaire was administer to the Human 
Resource Managers in the town halls of the largest Spanish cities. 
Findings- Outsourcing is a complement which seeks to improve the services delivered, and local institutions do 
not resort to it due to a lack of internal resources but as a way to complement their own capabilities.  
Originality/value- The paper has identified three distinct strategic profiles in the town halls interviewed which 
coincide with the profiles that Miles & Snow call prospective, defensive and reactive strategies. It is checked that 
town halls which outsource to a greater extent are the ones which identify more with the prospective or reactive 
strategy, whereas those which outsource less are closer to the defensive strategy.  
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OUTSOURCING AND STRATEGY IN SPANISH TOWN HALLS: A FIELD STUDY 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Management in Public Administration has been involved in a new ‘philosophy’ or set of 
ideas known as New Public Management (NPM) since the late 1980s. NPM covers different 
themes (Hood, 1995), but is essentially focused on improving managerial efficiency in the 
public sector, copying ideas from private enterprises and orienting them towards an 
improvement in the service delivered to citizens (Jacobsen, 2005; Mathiasen, 1999; 
Yamamoto, 2003). NPM has been somehow seen as the new paradigm which must replace 
the bureaucratic administration that is typical of many public bodies and institutions (Gow 
 3 
and Dufour, 2000) and it needs new structures and management forms to achieve that goal. 
Among these new management modalities is the outsourcing of services. 
In recent years, outsourcing has become a key strategy in the private sector when it comes to 
reduce the complexity of organisations, to control costs and, in short, to improve 
competitiveness. This strategy affects organisations’ structures by determining that some 
activities which correspond to a firm can be carried out outside by a specialised provider, in 
return for an agreed price. Although there is a lot of research on outsourcing within the 
private sector, its study is not so common within the public sector and, more precisely, in 
municipal management. That is why we are going to ask ourselves the following question in 
this paper: what is the situation of municipal services’ outsourcing in the largest Spanish 
town halls? 
On the other hand, research on private organisations suggests that a good adjustment 
between strategies, structures and processes can be associated with better results; however, 
not much research has been done on this matter in the public sector (Andrews, Boyne, Law 
and Walker, 2009): more efforts are required to deepen into the links between strategy and 
other organisational features in this sector. This study has as its aim to analyse such links in 
the case of the largest Spanish town halls, for which we are going to use the paper written by 
Miles and Snow (1978) about models for organisational strategies. For this reason, we will 
ask ourselves a second and a third question: do Spanish town halls follow the strategies 
suggested in Miles and Snow’s model? And, is there a relationship between the strategic 
position adopted by town halls and their stance on outsourcing? 
We have structured this paper in a number of different sections to answer the aforesaid 
questions; after the introduction we will review the literature on public administrations, on 
strategy and public management, and will propose our study, taking into account the aspects 
in which it differs from the previous research works dedicated to outsourcing in public 
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management. This will be followed by an explanation of the methodology applied during the 
fieldwork, where we justify the use of a questionnaire administered to Human Resource 
(HHRR) Managers in the town halls of the largest Spanish cities. The paper will finish with 
a summary of the main results and conclusions drawn from our research.  
 
CONCEPTUAL BACKGROUND 
Outsourcing in Public Management 
The notion of NPM demands, on the one hand, the reduction and/or ‘rightsizing’ of the 
public sector, the adoption of market-based principles and the assumption of responsibilities 
and government programmes by the private sector (Bradbury and Waechter, 2009). 
Therefore, service outsourcing, which could be called also commissioning or contracting out 
(Willcocks and Currie, 1997), enters public administrations under NPM, which conceives it 
as a key tool to achieve economic efficiency (Helgason and Klareskov, 2005). However, not 
only economic considerations but also political ones promote outsourcing to a greater or 
lesser extent, this trend being clearly favoured by governments with a neoliberal slant 
(Young, 2007). Furthermore, different countries in the world have embraced outsourcing and 
other NPM recommendations more fervently than others. Thus, while Anglo-Saxon 
countries have witnessed the birth and have enthusiastically welcomed both NPM and 
outsourcing –it is the case of the United Kingdom, Australia or New Zealand– other 
countries have not been so proactive; it is the case of Continental Europe and, therefore, the 
case of Spain. What we need to make clear is that many of the public services are nothing 
special and can therefore be regarded as any other business (Helgason and Klareskov, 2005), 
as long as they fulfil the type of social and public objectives for which they were conceived. 
The following issues should be considered before a service outsourcing decision in public 
management: 
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Priority of activities and outsourcing. According to Young (2007), those services which are 
not seen as basic (core services) are more prone to be outsourced; however, the most 
complex and professional areas are more difficult to outsource due to the power owned by 
workers and to the difficulty in measuring and controlling the specifications related to 
services. On the other hand, according to Helgason and Klareskov (2005), the outsourcing of 
uncomplicated, low-category services can only bring limited benefits, whereas complex 
services have a greater potential to generate cost savings if they are outsourced. The 
dilemma lies in the fact that the more complexity of tasks and the more potential savings, the 
more risk of failure in outsourcing. Before these unclear results drawn from previous 
research works, it seems advisable to try to determine the priority or importance of the 
different public services and analyse the link between that priority and the outsourcing level. 
Impact caused by outsourcing on service improvement. Outsourcing permits to improve 
services because access is gained to the knowledge and capabilities of providers supposedly 
specialized in such services (Cannadi and Dollery, 2005). Furthermore, services improve 
because organisations focus on key operations and outsource the least strategic ones (Brown 
and Potoski, 2003); this argument stems from the idea that any organisation must be able to 
identify its competitive advantages, focus on them and give up carrying out activities for 
which it is not specialised and in which it is not efficient. Another of the arguments on which 
this improvement is based has to do with the fact that outsourcing makes possible a transfer 
and flow of knowledge between providers and customers of the outsourced services (Norton 
and Blanco, 2009). 
Outsourcing and control over the services delivered. The achievement of the 
abovementioned improvements will only be possible if governments and public 
administrations manage and supervise the outsourced services much more closely than when 
these services are delivered internally (Marvel and Marvel, 2007). Public managers need to 
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have a number of competences and capabilities which allow them to assess the feasibility of 
the external service; they must equally have the power to implement projects and evaluate 
the services delivered (Bradbury and Waechter, 2009). Many outsourcing projects in public 
management have failed because they underestimated its real needs; time is required for 
provider management (Brown and Potoski, 2003). Public bodies can see outsourcing as a 
strategy to minimise the complexity of public management and somehow reduce or play 
down its responsibilities, being unaware of the fact that management needs to change its 
orientation, from managing and supervising civil servants to managing and supervising 
providers. 
Influence exerted by outsourcing on cost control. Outsourcing makes it possible to control 
costs and achieve more efficiency. This is due to the fact that when one proceeds to 
outsource, the need arises to control the services delivered in a systematic way (Helgason 
and Klareskov, 2005), which is why those activities that are not outsourced are subjected to 
analysis seeking to determine how much it costs to deliver these services internally and 
comparing that cost with the price that an external provider would charge us. In this way, 
outsourcing makes us rethink how competitive we are with respect to the market. 
Outsourcing additionally permits to obtain labour flexibility (Young, 2007). The customer of 
these services does not hire a worker but the services of a firm for a limited period of time, 
and it will be that firm’s responsibility to deal with labour relations and the costs linked to 
them. However, many outsourcing contracts are long-term ones. This is an interesting 
paradox, since outsourcing theoretically turns fixed costs (for instance, those associated with 
workers on the staff of public administrations, or those related to the equipment and 
infrastructures needed to deliver public services) into variable costs (the monthly payment to 
the outsourcing provider). In any case, the truth is that outsourcing contracts in public 
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management are mostly long-term contracts, which is why the long-sought flexibility in 
management could become a myth. 
Influence exerted by outsourcing on the image of public management before the citizens. 
Since public organisations are perceived as inefficient and bureaucratic in most cases, 
promoting ideas related to outsourcing, especially during periods of elections or economic 
crises, in order to demonstrate their wish to make political changes in this area (Bensghir and 
Tekneci, 2008) is likely to be well received. Nevertheless, outsourcing may also have 
negative effects on the image of public administrations for the following reasons: 
o The distance between government and citizens increases (Norton and Blanco, 2009). 
Quite a few citizens are likely to perceive that, due to outsourcing, the State becomes 
increasingly separated from them because the private firm which delivers the outsourced 
services stands between these citizens and their government. 
o Politicisation in service delivery: politicians have intervened too often in contracting 
with private providers, with quite a few cases of corruption and favouritism when it 
comes to award public contracts (Fernandez, 2007). 
o The State becomes empty of its content: if public administrations ultimately try to 
outsource any public service, the risks exist for the State to lose all its content, its role 
being limited to encourage providers to compete for the delivery of public services 
(Norton and Blanco, 2009).  
 
Strategy in Public Management 
Strategic planning could still be regarded as something rather unusual in public 
administrations during the 1980s. Thus, Eadie (1983) highlighted that strategic planning in 
the public sector was still in its infancy and Denhardt (1985) pointed out that, although 
strategic planning was already essential for private firms and for some public bodies, it was 
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not frequent at all in the context of local administrations. However, strategic approaches in 
the public sector, and more precisely in local administrations, stopped being an option to 
become a necessity by the mid-1990s, as is highlighted by Bolton and Leach (2002). This 
happened because both the financial restrictions and the requirements to improve efficiency 
made it necessary to use tools which could help these institutions to orient themselves within 
an environment that was, to say the least, uncertain. It can consequently be stated that 
strategic planning and management techniques have fully entered the public sector in the last 
twenty years (Poister and Streib, 2005). Both academicians and private sector executives 
have shown great interest during this period in trying to determine how the use of strategic 
management tools could improve business performance. This has also been the case in 
public management, local administrations being the area which has received the most 
attention in the literature. 
Among the different strategic management models stands out that of Miles and Snow 
(1978), one of the most often used in the study of the public sector. Thus, Greenwood 
(1987), Poister and Streib (2005), Meier, O’Toole, Boyne and Walker (2007), Enticott and 
Walker (2008) and Andrews, Boyne, Law and Walker (2009) have published papers where 
that model provides the basis for the analysis of local administrations, public schools or 
other types of public bodies. 
Miles and Snow’s model (1987) defines a typology of organisational strategies which 
contains four ideal types: Prospectors, Defenders, Analysers and Reactors.  
Prospectors: these are vanguard organisations which almost permanently seek opportunities 
in the market and which experiment on potential responses to its emergent trends. They are 
usually pioneers in new products and/or new customers. 
Defenders: these are traditional organisations with a conservative vision of new product 
development. They typically compete in price and quality rather than with new products or 
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markets, and especially dedicate their attention to improve efficiency in their existing 
operations. 
Analysers: they represent an intermediate category between prospectors and defenders. 
Reactors: these are organisations without a clearly defined strategy in which, despite 
perceiving high uncertainty levels, executives do not have a consistent strategy to react 
before that uncertainty. Reactors hardly ever make adjustments of any kind until they are 
forced to do so by pressures in the environment. 
Many authors such as Conant, Mokwa and Varadatajan (1990) criticise the models which 
classify strategies in watertight typologies, as each organisation does not follow only one 
type of strategy; on the contrary, it is usual to find hybrid strategies. This is the case in 
public organisations because they have to satisfy a wide range of objectives which compete 
with one another and are observed by different types of parties involved (citizens, 
politicians, mass media, users, regulators, etc.)  (Andrews, Boyne, Law and Walker, 2009). It 
is consequently better to assume that strategy categories are not watertight; instead, a 
continuum exists between the different categories. This would imply that the ‘analysers’ 
category is redundant, as it represents the combination of two categories (prospectors and 
defenders).  
 
Our proposal: Outsourcing and Strategy 
Table 1 collects some of the works which have analysed outsourcing in the public sector, 
specifying the goal sought in each one of them as well as their methodology; we add 
information about the aims and methodology of the present paper in the last row.   
INSERT TABLE 1 
 
METHODOLOGY 
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Based on the assumption that the largest town halls apply more strategic management 
techniques, such as outsourcing (Agranoff and McGuire, 2003; Berman, 1996; Boje and 
Whetten, 1981; Poister and Streib, 2005), we decided to send a questionnaire to the town 
halls of the largest Spanish cities, taking the number of inhabitants as the index for town hall 
size. For that purpose we have used the database called La Web Municipal
1
 [The municipal 
website]. Although looking for multiple information sources in each town hall would 
probably have been interesting in order to provide a more varied perspective in the results, 
we decided to administer the questionnaire only to the Human Resources managers because 
working with a single informant could allow us to obtain better response rates. Furthermore, 
HHRR managers have an overall vision of the organisations where they develop their 
professional activity as well as a wide knowledge of the organisational strategy (Kulik and 
Perry, 2008), which is why we thought that they are good candidates to answer the 
questionnaire. 
The questionnaire was prepared taking as a reference the literature on strategy in town halls 
and was reviewed by three experts in local administration management. After uploading it to 
a web page, we sent a postal letter to the different town halls (c/o the Human Resources 
manager) letting them know that we would like them to complete the questionnaire the link 
for which was included in that letter. Next we made a follow-up via telephone which allowed 
us to access the e-mail address and/or telephone number of the HHRR manager or the Town 
Hall, and a second call was made via e-mail. A final telephone call was made in order to 
increase the response rate. Although the total questionnaire includes 17 items, only 5 of them 
are analysed in this paper.   
We have examined 388 answers from 1,000 town halls interviewed, which represents a 
38.8% response rate (sampling error: 3.8%). Table 2 shows the study technical 
                                                 
1
 http://www.lawebmunicipal.com 
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specifications. It is worth highlighting that the number of answers is superior or similar to 
that obtained in other research studies carried out in local administrations (Enticott and 
Walker, 2008; Proeller, 2007; Sebaa, Wallace and Cornelius, 2009). The town halls which 
answered the questionnaire are representative of the total population in terms of size 
(measured by number of inhabitants) and regarding territorial distribution, as all the 
Autonomous Regions are represented in the sample. Student’s t-test (t value = 0.838; 
significance = 0.402) was used to determine the possible mean difference in the sample by 
size (number of inhabitants). The degree of independence between Autonomous Region and 
response level was determined by means of the Chi-square test (Chi-square value = 13.842; 
significance = 0.610).  
INSERT TABLE 2 
Table 3 presents the measurements corresponding to the most important variables used in the 
study along with their reliability level. It is worth pointing out that the activities identified in 
each town hall reflects those which are usually performed in most of them, as the authors 
have detected through their consulting and research experience in local administrations. 
INSERT TABLE 3 
 
RESULTS 
Characteristics of Town Halls and Interviewees  
INSERT TABLE 4 
Table 4 confirms that the town halls which answered the questionnaire have a large size, as it 
can be checked that the average number of inhabitants exceeds 40,000 and that we find 
ourselves before organisations with an average annual budget of more than 93 million euros 
and staff numbers of nearly 400 people on average.  
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As for interviewees (Figure 1), since the questionnaire was addressed to the Human 
Resources manager in these local institutions, we can see that that a high response rate came 
from those jobs or positions (42%), but we also find interviewees who identify themselves 
only as technicians (24%) or HHRR administrative workers (11%). The answer undoubtedly 
lies in the fact that this happens in smaller town halls where the tasks related to human 
resources are carried out by individuals who, despite their position and responsibilities, are 
not considered within the ‘head’ category. Moreover, the questionnaire was completed by 
politicians (mayor, deputy mayor or town hall secretary) in 8% of the cases. 
We can see how the interviewees are mostly men, although without an excessive imbalance 
(56% of men as opposed to 44% of women) and how their age range is mostly situated 
between 40 and 49 years of age. On the other hand, a majority of interviewees is located in 
group A (78%); this group is formed by employees whose job requires having completed 
university studies. A much smaller number belongs to group C, administrative staff for 
whom university studies are not a requirement. Although 40% of the interviewees do not 
have a very high seniority, as they have occupied the position for 5 years, the average 
seniority in the job is 10 years. In our opinion, all these characteristics about the profile of 
interviewees allow us to state that they fulfil all the training, seniority, hierarchy and position 
requirements needed to make them apt to answer our questionnaire. 
INSERT FIGURE 1 
Outsourcing 
INSERT TABLE 5  
The importance or priority that each town hall assigns to its different services and the extent 
to which these services are outsourced appears in Table 5. The first outstanding aspect is the 
fact that the different town halls assign quite a lot of importance to all the areas mentioned, 
since all of them are assessed above the average.  To this must be added that there is not a 
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significant difference between the most valued areas and the least valued ones; in short, all 
services are generally seen as being very important. 
Nevertheless, that same table equally reflects a low outsourcing level in the last columns, as 
even the most often outsourced service, namely cleaning, parks and rubbish collection, 
receives an average subcontracting score of 4.96, just above the average value on the likert 
scale, which is 4. Moreover, the rest of services are outsourced to an even lesser extent. A 
special mention must be made of the public safety area which is carried out –as it could 
logically be expected– by staff belonging to the town hall itself, since this task falls upon 
civil servants by law in most cases. 
Next we tried to check the possible existence of a positive or negative relationship between 
the importance given by town halls to the different services and the extent to which those 
services are outsourced. For this purpose, we have carried out a correlation analysis and later 
reinforced our conclusions with a mean difference test. We have elaborated a new variable 
called ‘outsourcing degree’
2
 in order to perform that analysis. This variable discriminates 
whether a town hall outsources above or below the average. Its calculation results from 
adding up the scores (from 1 to 7) given to the extent to which each service is outsourced by 
each town hall, which in turn gives rise to a new variable known as ‘outsourcing sum.’ We 
have calculated the mean and median of that sum (45.6 and 45.5, respectively). Then, the 
‘outsourcing degree’ arises from giving a value 1 (it outsources above the average) to those 
town halls with a total outsourcing sum exceeding 45.5, while a value 0 (it outsources below 
the average) is given to those with a sum of less than 45.5. The median allows us to have a 
                                                 
2
  
Outsourcing degree No. % 
Below Average 194 50.0 
Above Average 194 50.0 
Total 388 100.0 
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central cut-off measure with 194 town halls which outsource below the average and another 
194 which outsource above the average.  
INSERT TABLE 6 
Many positive correlations –significant in a lot of cases– between the importance assigned to 
the different services delivered by a town hall and their outsourcing level can be observed in 
Table 6. Furthermore, Student’s t-test or the non-parametric Mann-Whitney U-test, used 
when there is no homoscedasticity in the variables, enables us to reinforce this conclusion 
once more, that is, the more priority or importance is given by the town hall to a particular 
activity, the more often services related to that activity are outsourced. The only activity 
which has a completely opposite sign compared to the rest is public safety –already 
mentioned above– where the correlation between the importance given to this area by the 
different town halls and the extent to which it is outsourced turns out to be negative (though 
non-significant).  
INSERT TABLE 7 
We can additionally check (Table 7) that a relationship exists between the size of a town hall 
(measured by number of inhabitants in the municipality, its budget and its staff volume) and 
the proclivity to outsource activities. The town halls which outsource the most are also those 
with a greater size, more inhabitants, a larger budget and more staff. The non-parametric 
Man-Whitney U-test has made it possible for us to verify this relationship. 
Regarding the opinion of town halls about outsourcing (Table 8), they underline that it 
contributes to a better service for citizens and that outsourced services are properly 
controlled by town halls. It is also seen as relevant, though to a lesser extent, that 
outsourcing permits to reduce costs. On the whole, town halls do not seem to think that they 
have a large number of services subcontracted with other firms. Neither do they think that 
increasing the outsourcing level would permit to improve services even more. In general, we 
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detect a rather conservative stance in relation to outsourcing among the town halls 
interviewed; it can actually be seen by the mean, the median and the mode for the items 
consulted that their views about outsourcing are not excessively enthusiastic in most cases. 
INSERT TABLE 8 
Strategy 
INSERT TABLE 9 
Regarding the strategic profile of town halls (Table 9), we can identify as one of its most 
relevant features the interest in achieving qualitative aims and ensuring that their services 
reach the highest possible number of users, without this meaning that diversity and respect 
for the needs of social minorities are disregarded. Furthermore, town halls seek novelty in 
the services that they offer, trying at the same time not to neglect the traditional areas. As for 
their attitude towards outsourcing, the results in Table 6 are confirmed, since town halls 
mostly seek the use of their internal resources rather than the involvement of the private 
sector in the delivery of their services. Town halls often admit that they do not have a good 
short-term or long-term planning and that they are not very innovative or advanced either. 
A Principal Components factor analysis with the information about the items related to the 
strategic stance of town halls comes next. This factor analysis seeks to reduce the 
information offered by the original variables into a set of factors or constructs which underlie 
that information, and with a fewer number of variables than in the original group. Each 
factor can thus be considered a combination of several original variables. Highlighting the 
underlying factors in each group has as its aim to obviate the redundant or less important 
information. We have checked that this type of factor analysis is pertinent
3
. Kaiser’s 
                                                 
3
  
Correlation Matrix Determinant 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Index 
Bartlett Test of Specificity 
Significance 
0.024 
0.828 
1293.441 
0.000 
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criterion suggests that it would be advisable to extract three factors, as there are three 
eigenvalues above 1 which account for 60.646% of the information provided by the original 
variables (a satisfactory ratio because it exceeds 50%). We have carried out a Varimax 
rotation because it allows a better interpretation of factors; the results drawn from this 
analysis can be found in Table 10. 
INSERT TABLE 10 
The first factor basically coincides with the features that characterise the Prospective 
strategy; this is why we call it prospective strategy. The town halls which adopt this strategy 
seek to offer more innovative, vanguard services; moreover, they try to diversify their 
services as well as their markets (new services for existing users and existing services for 
new users); they equally pursue a strategy which caters both for a large number of users and 
for minorities, and these are also the town halls which develop both their short-term and their 
long-term strategy most carefully.  
The second factor is associated with the defensive strategy, which essentially seeks to 
continue offering the traditional services and to obtain a good output from its internal 
resources. The item referred to cost reduction contributes with nearly the same degree of 
participation both in this factor and in the previous one, which is why we have decided not to 
interpret it because we cannot correlate it with any separate factor. 
Finally, the third factor is clearly connected with the reactive strategy, the one which is 
common in organisations which only act driven by external pressures and which, in this case, 
more decidedly seeks the involvement of the private sector in the delivery of typical town 
hall services. 
Outsourcing and Strategy 
The next step is to find out which town halls assign higher value to the different services that 
they deliver. This will allow us to check if there is a link between level of importance and 
 17 
strategic profile. Later on, an attempt will be made to determine the possible relationship 
between strategic profile and outsourcing degree. The analysis that we have carried out here 
is identical to the one reflected in Table 6, with the profile of each town hall and the 
importance that it assigns to each activity. We have built the ‘importance of the activity’ 
variable in more or less the same way as the ‘outsourcing degree’ variable. Similarly, a new 
variable has been calculated for each one of the town hall activities depending on whether 
that activity was more or less important for a given town hall, that is, on whether it had a 
level of importance above the average or below the average. In this case, we also take the 
median for each activity’s level of importance as the central or cut-off measure (see 
Appendix I)
4
. The prospective strategy correlates positively with the importance given to all 
town hall functions. Mean difference is significant too, that is, those town halls which 
consider each function more important identify more clearly with the prospective strategy. 
Also the town halls which adopt the defensive strategy assign great relevance to most town 
hall activities (except for the case of activities related to public transport and old town 
revitalisation). Instead, town halls which are closer to a reactive strategy are the ones which 
give the least importance to many town hall functions. 
INSERT TABLE 11 
We can verify in Table 11 how town halls which are closer to proactive and reactive stances 
outsource more than those which are further from these stances. However, town halls which 
are closer to the defensive strategy outsource below the average. In this last case, the level of 
significance between both variables (defensive strategy and outsourcing degree) is lower 
than in the previous cases (90.8%), but even so it is still possible to see the mean difference 
between both variables. 
 
                                                 
4
 The corresponding tables, which are similar to Table 6, are included in an appendix to make reading easier. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
The survey carried out among the largest Spanish town halls reveals the low level of 
outsourcing in municipal services, the cleaning, parks and rubbish collection service being 
the most often outsourced, and the public safety service the one in which the participation of 
external firms is least sought. Even in the most often outsourced activities, there is only 
partial trust in the collaboration of external services; in other words, town halls opt for a 
partial or selective type of outsourcing, rejecting the practice of total or extreme outsourcing 
(Bradbury and Waechter, 2009). We can additionally observe the existence of a positive 
relationship between the importance that each town hall assigns to the different activities and 
the outsourcing degree, that is, the more importance is given to an activity, the more they 
resort to collaboration with external  firms (except in the case of the aforementioned public 
safety activity). On the other hand, larger-sized town halls (with a greater number of 
inhabitants, a higher budget and a greater staff volume) are the ones which most often hire 
external firm services. This leads us to think that outsourcing in Spanish town halls is a 
complement which seeks to improve the services delivered, and that these local institutions 
do not resort to it due to a lack of internal resources but as a way to complement their own 
capabilities. The opinions expressed by town halls, according to which outsourcing can help 
to deliver a better service to citizens and is not a strategy which serves above all to control 
costs, are in keeping with the results obtained in previous studies (Norton and Blanco, 2009). 
In any case, it can be said that the attitude of town halls towards outsourcing is quite 
conservative in general terms. This conservative stance probably responds to the cultural 
models which are typical of Spain and even of Continental Europe as a whole (Helgason and 
Klarescov, 2005).  
Regarding the strategic profile of town halls, we can identify as one of its most relevant 
features the interest in achieving qualitative aims and ensuring that their services reach the 
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highest possible number of users, without this meaning that diversity and respect for the 
needs of social minorities are disregarded. Furthermore, town halls seek novelty in the 
services that they offer, trying at the same time not to neglect the traditional areas. As for 
their attitude towards outsourcing, it is confirmed that town halls seek above all the use of 
their internal resources rather than the involvement of the private sector in the delivery of 
their services. Town halls generally admit that they do not have a good short-term or long-
term planning and that they are not very innovative or advanced either. 
The utilization of a factor analysis has enabled us to identify three distinct strategic profiles 
in the town halls interviewed –the same as in the study of Andrews, Boyne, Law and Walker 
(2009)– which coincide with the profiles that Miles and Snow (1978) call prospective, 
defensive and reactive strategies, the first two being the strategies which generally assign 
more importance to the different town hall services, while the third one considers them less 
important. When we relate these strategic profiles to the attitudes of town halls before 
outsourcing, it is checked that town halls which outsource to a greater extent are the ones 
which identify more with the prospective or reactive strategy, whereas those which 
outsource less are closer to the defensive strategy. The explanation probably lies in the fact 
that the defensive strategy is more conservative and, therefore, perhaps takes outsourcing 
less into account as an option to offer or improve town hall services. Maybe reactive town 
halls resort to outsourcing because, since they do not give so much relevance to services, 
their aim is basically to reduce their responsibilities in that area. Instead, prospective town 
halls regard services as something very important and, as we said before, for them 
outsourcing represents a way to complement and improve their services. 
As regards limitations, in methodological terms, our study is exclusively based on the 
analysis of the answers given by the Human Resources managers in the town halls 
interviewed. Despite the qualification that this position provides to express opinions about 
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outsourcing, having access to the views of managers responsible for other local government 
areas would widen the vision about this topic. Furthermore, it would be interesting to 
contrast our conclusions with case studies where the people in charge of outsourced services 
could endorse –or challenge– those conclusions. 
Regarding future lines of research, in our opinion, although some research studies have been 
devoted to outsourcing in the public sector, a lot of aspects still need to be examined. In the 
present analysis, we have focused on the interconnections between organisational strategy 
and outsourcing in the public sector, an issue that we had not seen being developed so far. In 
any case, the literature on outsourcing in the public sector still has to provide some clear 
guidelines that can help to know which services are important candidates to outsourcing and 
how the contracting of services must be effectively guided (Young, 2007). 
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Table 1: Outsourcing Studies in the public sector 
Study Objective Methodology 
Claver, González, 
Gascó and Llopis 
(2002) 
To study Information Systems outsourcing  
reasons, risk and success factors in Spanish 
public universities 
A survey among 35 
Information Systems 
managers in Spanish public 
universities 
Marvel and 
Marvel (2007) 
To study the mechanisms used by town halls 
to control outsourced activities, drawing a 
comparison between these activities and the 
ones which are internally managed   
A survey among 137 city 
town halls at the USA 
Ward (2007) To study the outsourcing of services at public 
libraries, specifically control mechanisms, 
cost savings and citizen satisfaction  
7 case studies in the USA 
 
Young (2007-
2008) 
To study the outsourcing of public health 
services, the reasons to outsource and the 
characteristics of the outsourced services that 
achieve good results 
4 case studies in Australia  
Bradbury and 
Waechter (2009)  
To study Extreme Outsourcing at local 
administrations. We identify ‘extreme 
outsourcing’ with two strategies: to outsource 
everything except management or to 
outsourcing nothing but management.  
Case Studies in the USA 
(non-specified number) 
Feiock and Jang 
(2009) 
To study the involvement of non-profit 
organisations in local services addressed to 
seniors 
 Survey. Secondary 
information from a database. 
472 questionnaires 
administered to town halls. 
USA 
Bensghir and 
Tekneci (2008) 
To study Information Systems outsourcing at 
Computer departments in Turkish ministries 
Survey. Turkey. The 
number of answers is not 
specified 
Lambright  (2009) To study suppliers’ reasons to properly  use 
the tools required to control their services 
7 case studies in the USA 
Murray, Rentell 
and Geere (2008) 
To analyse the outsourcing of services at little 
town halls through the establishment of 
consortia 
6 case studies in the UK  
Our study To analyse the situation of outsourcing and  
the relationship between outsourcing and 
strategic positioning in the largest Spanish 
town halls 
A survey among 388 large 
town halls in Spain 
 
 
Table 2: Study technical specifications 
Scope 
Population 
Sample size  
Sampling Error 
Survey Date 
Spain 
1,000 largest Town Halls (by population)  
388 (38.8%) 
3.8% 
July 2009-March 2010 
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Table 3: Measures of variables and reliability 
Constructor Source Measure 
Reliability 
(Cronbach’s α) 
Importance assigned to 
town hall activities 
Own materials 
15 items, 1-7 
likert scale 
0.934 
Outsourcing of town hall 
activities 
Own materials 
15 items, 1-7 
likert scale 
0.909 
Opinion about outsourcing 
Brown and Potoski (2003); Murria, 
Rentell and Geere (2008) and own 
materials 
6 items, 1-7 
likert scale 
0.857 
Town hall strategic profile 
Andrews, Boyne and Walker (2006); 
Boyne and Walker (2004) and own 
materials 
11 items, 1-7 
likert scale 
0.762 
 
Table 4: Town hall size 
 Mean Median Mode Maximum Minimum 
No. of inhabitants 41,579 16,102 6,434 566,447 6,434 
Budget (€)  93,082,000 15,500,000 7,000,000 900,000,000 5,200,000 
Staff volume (No. of workers) 381 190 200 5300 13 
 
Table 5: Town hall services, priority and outsourcing 
 Priority assigned by the 
town hall to the service 
Outsourcing degree at the 
service 
Town hall services Mean Median Mode Mean Median Mode 
Cleaning, Parks and rubbish collection 5.54 6 6 4.96 6 7 
Culture 5.36 5 5 3.09 3 5 
Public safety 5.32 5 6 1.70 1 1 
Sports 5.31 5 6 3.38 4 4 
Commerce, development and employment 5.27 5 6 2.67 3 1 
Town-planning and housing 5.22 5 5 2.60 2 2 
Seniors’ programmes 5.16 5 6 2.89 3 2 
Underprivileged groups 5.09 5 6 2.75 2.5 2 
Youth programmes 4.91 5 5 2.79 3 2 
Tourism and promotion  4.80 5 5 2.84 3 1 
Environmental quality 4.74 5 5 3.35 4 5 
Facility maintenance  4.68 5 5 3.90 4 5 
Old town revitalisation 4.49 5 5 2.77 2 0 
Health 4.11 4 4 2.47 2 0 
Public transport 4.10 4 4 3.41 3 0 
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Table 6: Correlation analysis and equality of means test (priority and outsourcing) 
     Levene  
Priority Pearson’s R Sign. Outsourcing Degree Mean F Sign. T (student) or U 
Mann-Whitney 
Sign. 
Cleaning, parks and rubbish 
collection 
0.116 0.024* Above average 
Below average 
5.095 
4.863 
0.106 0.744 1.031 0.303 
Facility maintenance  0.139 0.007* Above average 
Below average 
4.161 
3.666 
4.753 0.030 2.404 0.017* 
Public transport 0.342 0.000* Above average 
Below average 
4.182 
2.316 
2.152 0.143 6.981 0.000* 
Sports 0.132 0.010* Above average 
Below average 
3.618 
2.777 
2.311 0.129 3.503 0.001* 
Environmental quality 0.028 0.593 Above average 
Below average 
3.437 
3.346 
0.475 0.491 0.431 0.666 
Culture 0.090 0.080 Above average 
Below average 
3.185 
2.945 
0.772 0.380 0.946 0.345 
Seniors’ programmes 0.249 0.000* Above average 
Below average 
3.181 
2.327 
7.281 0.007 11330 0.000* 
Tourism and promotion 0.227 0.000* Above average 
Below average 
3.267 
2.342 
12.009 0.001 12090 0.000* 
Youth programmes 0.166 0.001* Above average 
Below average 
3.033 
2.485 
13.577 0.000 14018 0.016* 
Old town revitalisation 0.394 0.000* Above average 
Below average 
3.659 
2.216 
4.751 0.030 9706 0.000* 
Underprivileged groups 0.094 0.067 Above average 
Below average 
2.917 
2.446 
13.876 
0.000 12956 0.033* 
Commerce, development and 
employment 
0.131 0.005* Above average 
Below average 
2.854 
2.339 
0.031 0.861 2.489 0.013* 
Town-planning and housing 0.094 0.035* Above average 
Below average 
2.755 
2.288 
6.908 0.009 12190 0.045* 
Health 0.133 0.005* Above average 
Below average 
2.813 
2.102 
4.726 0.030 12612 0.000* 
Public safety -0.019 0.359 Above average 
Below average 
1.720 
1.695 
0.026 0.872 0.126 0.900 
 
Table 7: Town hall size and outsourcing 
    Levene  
Size variables Outsourcing Degree Mean F Sign. U Mann-Whitney Sign. 
No. of inhabitants 
Above average 
Below average 
55,222 
28,077 
34,771 0.000 15,564 0.005 
Budget (€)  
Above average 
Below average 
147,640,000 
41,829,000 
19,585 0.000 1,192 0.000 
Staff volume (No. 
of workers) 
Above average 
Below average 
494 
263 26,257 0.000 13,630 0.015 
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Table 8: Opinion about outsourcing 
Opinion about outsourcing Mean Median Mode 
The outsourced services permit to offer a better service to citizens 4.37 5 7 
The town hall has a good control over the outsourced services 4.04 4 6 
The outsourced services make it possible to save costs  3.96 4 6 
The outsourced services allow us to keep a good image among citizens 3.94 4 4 
Increasing the number of outsourced services would permit to improve the 
services delivered to citizens 
3.70 4 4 
The number of services subcontracted with external firms is very high 3.44 4 3 
 
Table 9: Town hall strategic profile 
 Mean Median Mode 
We try to ensure that services reach the highest possible number of citizens  5.763 6 7 
We try to ensure that services reach social minorities 5.213 5 6 
Offering new services to the existing citizens is a priority  4.736 5 5 
The services that we offer are focused on traditional areas 4.694 5 5 
We try to use internal resources in the delivery of services  4.685 5 5 
External pressures are the ones which exert the strongest influence on the 
services offered  
4.638 5 5 
Offering the existing services to new users is a priority 4.589 5 4 
Cost savings are essential when it comes to deliver a service  4.473 4 4 
The services that we offer are in the vanguard of the most innovative town 
halls 
3.869 4 4 
We seek private sector involvement in the delivery of services  3.745 4 3 
A good short-term and long-term strategic planning exists 3.366 3 5 
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Table 10: Total Variance explained and rotated component matrix in factor strategy  
Total variance explained Rotated Factor Matrix 
 Initial eigenvalues Rotation sum of squared loadings Variable Factor 
Factor Total 
Percentage 
of variance 
Cumulative
% 
Total 
Percentage 
of variance 
Cumulative
% 
 1 2 3 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
4.110 
1.502 
1.059 
0.893 
0.828 
0.642 
0.557 
0.433 
0.394 
0.333 
0.249 
37.367 
13.654 
9.625 
8.121 
7.529 
5.837 
50.60 
3.937 
3.579 
3.024 
2.267 
37.367 
51.021 
60.646 
68.766 
76.296 
82.133 
87.193 
91.130 
94.709 
97.733 
100.000 
3.638 
1.653 
1.380 
33.070 
15.030 
12.545 
33.070 
48.101 
60.646 
Services are in the vanguard 
Traditional services 
External pressures 
Exist. services for new users 
New services for exist. users 
Cost savings are essentials 
Private sector involvement  
Use of internal services  
Serv. to highest No. of citiz. 
Serv. to social minorities 
A good strat. planning exists 
0.846 
 
 
0.707 
0.799 
0.340 
 
 
0.624 
0.663 
0.736 
 
0.616 
 
 
 
0.337 
 
0.748 
 
 
0.759 
 
 
 
0.724 
 
 
Table 11: Outsourcing and strategic positioning 
    Levene 
Factors Outsourcing degree Mean F Sign. 
T (student) or U 
Mann-Whitney 
Sign. 
Proactive strategy Above average 
Below average 
0.236 
-0.255 
1.458 0.228 4.760 0.000 
Defensive strategy Above average 
Below average 
-0.084 
0.091 
10.969 0.001 14020 0.092 
Reactive strategy Above average 
Below average 
0.160 
-0.173 
3.114 0.078 3.181 0.002 
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Table 12: Correlation analysis, equality of means test, prospective strategy and priority   
     Levene  
Prospective strategy 
Pearson’s 
R 
Sign. 
Priority given to 
activity 
Mean F Sign. 
T (student) or U 
Mann-Whitney 
Sign. 
Environmental quality 0.597 0.000* More important 
Less important 
0.434 
-0.615 
0.929 0.336 11.154 0.000* 
Commerce, development and 
employment 
0.547 0.000* More important 
Less important 
0.300 
-0.744 
1.976 0.161 9.862 0.000* 
Culture 0.506 0.000* More important 
Less important 
0.192 
-0.735 
2.253 0.134 7.393 0.000* 
Cleaning, parks and rubbish 
collection 
0.532 0.000* More important 
Less important 
0.399 
-0.571 
0.353 0.553 9.950 0.000* 
Facility maintenance 0.521 0.000* More important 
Less important 
0.463 
-0.570 
0.079 0.779 11.069 0.000* 
Tourism and promotion 0.358 0.000* More important 
Less important 
0.232 
-0.324 
0.068 0.794 5.157 0.000* 
Underprivileged groups 0.539 0.000* More important 
Less important 
0.296 
-0.674 
0.283 0.595 9.187 0.000* 
Youth 0.465 0.000* More important 
Less important 
0.302 
-0.525 
0.411 0.522 8.023 0.000* 
Sports 0.437 0.000* More important 
Less important 
0.191 
-0.539 
0.216 0.642 6.186 0.000* 
Seniors’ programmes 0.417 0.000* More important 
Less important 
0.214 
-0.483 
0.181 0.671 6.247 0.000* 
Old town revitalisation 0.328 0.000* More important 
Less important 
0.280 
-0.253 
0.262 
0.609 4.974 0.000* 
Health 0.583 0.000* More important 
Less important 
0.385 
-0.647 
6.616 0.011 5804 0.000* 
Public safety 0.405 0.000* More important 
Less important 
0.200 
-0.569 
0.614 0.434 6.556 0.000* 
Public transport 0.530 0.000* More important 
Less important 
0.326 
-0.576 
0.455 0.500 8.283 0.000 
Town-planning and housing 0.371 0.000* More important 
Less important 
0.192 
-0.411 
0.057 0.811 5.297 0.000* 
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Table 13: Correlations analysis, equality of means test, defensive strategy and priority   
     Levene  
Defensive strategy 
Pearson’s 
R 
Sign. 
Priority given to 
activity 
Mean F Sign. 
T (student) or U 
Mann-Whitney 
Sign. 
Environmental quality 0.222 0.000* More important 
Less important 
0.141 
-0.212 
1.720 0.191 3.264 0.001* 
Commerce, development and 
employment 
0.283 0.000* More important 
Less important 
0.122 
-0.324 
0.122 0.728 3.790 0.000* 
Culture 0.125 0.020* More important 
Less important 
0.061 
-0.239 
9.306 0.002 8084 0.035* 
Cleaning, parks and rubbish 
collection 
0.357 0.000* More important 
Less important 
0.192 
-0.300 
0.077 0.781 4.638 0.000* 
Facility maintenance 0.296 0.000* More important 
Less important 
0.118 
-0.184 
4.860 0.028 12252 0.008* 
Tourism and promotion 0.128 0.018* More important 
Less important 
0.112 
-0.167 
2.116 0.147 2.513 0.012* 
Underprivileged groups 0.244 0.000 More important 
Less important 
0.128 
-0.311 
1.181 0.278 3.796 0.000* 
Youth 0.321 0.000* More important 
Less important 
0.152 
-0.303 
0.733 0.392 4.172 0.000* 
Sports 0.186 0.001* More important 
Less important 
0.090 
-0.276 
1.001 0.318 2.971 0.003* 
Seniors’ programmes 0.260 0.000* More important 
Less important 
0.121 
-0.296 
1.846 0.175 3.604 0.000* 
Old town revitalisation 0.026 0.643 More important 
Less important 
0.025 
-0.054 
0.358 
0.550 0.732 0.465 
Health 0.234 0.000* More important 
Less important 
0.163 
-0.301 
5.486 0.020 9984 0.000* 
Public safety  0.123 0.022* More important 
Less important 
0.093 
-0.270 
3.077 0.080 2.956 0.003* 
Public transport 0.038 0.504 More important 
Less important 
0.001 
-0.093 
0.137 0.711 0.790 0.430 
Town-planning and housing 0.230 0.000* More important 
Less important 
0.129 
-0.328 
3.725 0.054 3.899 0.000* 
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Table 14: Correlation analysis, equality of means test, reactive strategy and priority   
     Levene  
Reactive strategy 
Pearson’s 
R 
Sign. 
Priority given to 
activity 
Mean F Sign. 
T (student) or U 
Mann-Whitney 
Sign. 
Environmental quality -0.072 0.181 More important 
Less important 
0.024 
-0.048 
2.490 0.115 0.659 0.511 
Commerce, development and 
employment 
-0.136 0.011* More important 
Less important 
-0.048 
0.105 
0.372 0.542 -1.284 0.000* 
Culture -0.016 0.766 More important 
Less important 
0.006 
-0.076 
0.713 0.399 0.613 0.540 
Cleaning, parks and rubbish 
collection 
0.001 0.980 More important 
Less important 
0.012 
-0.076 
4.167 0.042 0.818 0.414 
Facility maintenance -0.187 0.000* More important 
Less important 
-0.074 
0.087 
0.161 0.688 -1.484 0.139 
Tourism and promotion -0.032 0.551 More important 
Less important 
-0.030 
0.044 
0.377 0.540 -0.673 0.501 
Underprivileged groups -0.029 0.585 More important 
Less important 
0.016 
-0.057 
0.189 0.664 0.632 0.528 
Youth -0.110 0.041* More important 
Less important 
-0.014 
-0.001 
0.110 0.740 -0.112 0.911 
Sports -0.081 0.132 More important 
Less important 
0.023 
-0.103 
0.687 0.408 1.025 0.306 
Seniors’ programmes -0.046 0.388 More important 
Less important 
-0.015 
0.018 
0.554 0.457 -0.290 0.772 
Old town revitalisation 0.001 0.990 More important 
Less important 
0.004 
-0.066 
4.767 
0.030 12880 0.413 
Health -0.095 0.077 More important 
Less important 
-0.035 
0.044 
0.336 0.562 -0.716 0.474 
Public safety  0.062 0.251 More important 
Less important 
0.053 
-0.197 
1.406 0.237 2.026 0.043* 
Public transport -0.030 0.590 More important 
Less important 
0.069 
0.098 
0.268 0.605 -0.977 0.329 
Town-planning and housing 0.076 0.160 More important 
Less important 
0.025 
-0.097 
3.529 0.061 1.028 0.305 
 
Figure 1: Interviewees’ profile 
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